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   This paper examines hidden action models of the relationship between a firm and multiple 
workers, and identifies cases where the firm prefers workers to collude via a binding agreement 
on their action choice. Worker collusion and appropriately redesigned wage contracts have a 
risk sharing advantage (i) when workers' action choice is completely independent; (ii) when 
the firm wants each worker to allocate his effort efficiently among various productive activi-
ties; or (iii) when team production exists. Worker collusion also achieves an efficient level of 
"socialization" among workers while noncooperative behavior leads to "under -socialization."
   KEYWORDS: Moral hazard, worker collusion, risk s 
fort allocation, team production, socialization.





                             1. Introduction 
   A firm is a human organization. The employer makes implicit or explicit employment 
contracts with workers. Based on the earlier work by Coase (1937) and Simon (1951), recent 
economic literature regards the employment relation as the most fundamental constituent 
of the firm, and analyzes various aspects of that relationship extensively. (See Hart and 
Holmstrom (1987) for a survey of agency theory, Williamson (1975, 1985) for transaction cost 
economics, and Kreps (1984) for an example of other theories of the firm.) 
    Given employment contracts and other aspects of formal organization structures, however, 
workers are engaged in interactions with co-workers. When wage schemes are interdependent, 
a worker's effort choice affects his co-workers' welfare. Also workers can influence co-workers 
through various kinds of direct interpersonal ctivities. Some actions are directly productive: 
workers may provide various kinds of help for co-workers. There exist psychologically oriented 
interactions as well: workers may spend resources to reduce co-workers' disutility on jobs, 
for example, by showing respects, cheering up each other, listening to their complaints, and 
so on. Realizing the existence of these interactions among workers, the employer designs 
contracts and organization structures so as to make their interpersonal relationship profitable 
to herself. Social relationship among workers has long been an important subject of sociologists 
studying organizations since the Human Relations School (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; 
Mayo, 1945).' Recently, Baron (1987) and -Granovetter (1985) review economic literature on 
organizations critically to point out its under-emphasis on social relations . 
   In this paper, we focus on interactions among workers and examine its implications on 
wage contracts and organization design. Models introduced are variants of standard agency 
models with moral hazard (which Arrow (1985) renamed hidden action): Workers take unob-
servable actions given wage contracts, while they possess no precontractual private informa -
tion. More . specifically, consider the following standard setting of the relationship between a 
risk neutral principal (a firm) and risk averse agents (workers). The firm assigns each worker 
to a well-defined job and selects awage schedule to him. Given his contract with the firm, 
each worker exerts a level of effort. The outcome of his job. depends on his effort and some 
noise term. Noise terms are assumed to be independent across jobs. The outcome is publicly 
 1 See also standard textbooks such as Perrow (1986) and Scott (1987) for other references, 





observable while the level of effort chosen is not, so that the wage schedule for each worker 
can depend only on the outcome of his job. Because of no externality of effort and the as-
sumption of stochastic independence across jobs, relative performance valuation does not 
give a reason for the wage schedule for a worker to depend upon outcomes of other workers' 
jobs. (See, for example, Holmstrom (1982) and Mookherjee (1984).) Suppose that the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of a worker is additively separable toutility on income 
and disutility on effort: workers are assumed to be effort averse. 
   The question asked in this paper is: If the firm can enforce workers to collude to play 
"cooperatively" in their action choice through various aspects of organization structures and 
personnel policies, does she prefer to do so? Worker collusion in this paper means that 
workers make decisions, via some binding agreement ontheir action choice, so as to maximize 
the sum of their expected utilities. In the setting described above, where the relation among 
workers is completely independent, the answer to the question turns out to be yes at least 
in symmetric situations. The literature on relative performance evaluation mentioned above 
implicitly assumes that workers play their effort choice game noncooperatively, i.e. select 
Nash equilibrium effort. Under this assumption, the literature shows that the optimal wage 
schedule to a worker is independent of the performance of the other workers, o that workers' 
effort choice game is reduce to a completely independent decision problem with no interaction. 
We however show that if workers collude, then in symmetric situations, the firm designs an 
interdependent wage scheme to create workers' interaction. This leads to risk sharing among 
workers, and it turns out that the firm can implement the same effort levels with lower costs 
under collusion than under noncooperative behavior. 
   The similar logic continues to hold under a certain condition when we introduce pro-
duction externalities orcorrelation across jobs so that the optimal wage scheme (under non-
cooperative behavior) is an interdependent one. We examine aspecific form of productive 
interpersonal activities called helping effort. A worker's own effort improves the outcome of 
his job, while his helping effort improves the outcome of the jobs occupied by his co-workers. 
Each worker's disutility on job is assumed to depend on the total amount of effort. Then 
we show that worker collusion leads to an efficient allocation of effort between own effort and 
helping effort. This implies that given the wage contract and the total amount of effort exerted 
by workers, neither wants to change the allocation of effort: It maximizes the expected profits. 
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Collusion results in the allocation efficiency because under symmetry, their cooperative ffort 
choice is always based on equal risk allocation among jobs, so that they never under-cooperate-
nor over-cooperate. Then we show that when the firm wants to implement an effort allocation 
efficient effort combination, she prefers worker collusion. This is because she can reduce the 
risk imposed on each worker without altering workers' incentives to select that effort combina-
tion. The same argument also implies, in more general situations, that when team production 
exists so that the firm can monitor only the total output of a group of workers, worker collu-
sion is preferable. An important feature of team-based wage schemes is that workers' wages 
are perfectly positively correlated with each other. This enables the firm to modify the wage 
scheme appropriately. On the other hand, if wages are negatively correlated as in the case of 
tournaments, the improvement of risk sharing changes workers' incentives to select the effort 
levels the firm wants to implement. Thus, our results do not apply to such cases. 
   Next we turn to nonproductive interpersonal activities which we call socialization. We 
add this variable to the basic model with no interaction among workers. A worker's level of 
socialization with another worker enters into only the disutility terms of both workers, and 
thereby it affects the productivity of neither worker. An increase in a worker's socialization 
reduces a level of disutility of his co-workers, while it increases the former worker's disutility for 
sufficient high levels of socialization. However, for small levels of socialization, a worker may 
be indifferent in his socialization level or may derive some "social. pleasure" from socializing 
so that his disutility may be decreasing in his socialization level. Then we show that when 
workers reach a Nash equilibrium of socialization, the equilibrium levels of socialization are less 
than the efficient levels: workers under-socialize when they behave noncooperatively. Since 
this proposition is not associated with the risk attitude of workers at all, it implies that even in 
the risk neutral situation, the firm cannot achieve the first-best solution (which is the solution 
under perfect information) when nonproductive interpersonal activities exist. 
   Collusion by risk neutral workers remedies this problem by increasing their socialization 
to the efficient levels: The first-best solution can be achieved by collusion when workers are risk 
neutral. However, when workers are risk averse, collusion is not always better since reducing 
the level of disutility has no relation to reducing the level of marginal disutility. The increase in 
levels of socialization through worker collusion has two opposite effects on a worker's marginal 






reduces his marginal disutility) and the negative ffect of the increase in his own socialization 
(which increases his marginal disutility). If the negative ffect dominates, the firm may prefer 
workers to play noncooperatively. Or even preventing workers from socializing by isolating 
them physically or by supervising them closely may be better. 
   So far we have assumed that the firm can induce workers to collude or not. How can she 
achieve worker collusion? The literature on game theory tells us that cooperation will emerge 
when the subgame ofeffort choice is repeated, provided that each worker can observe the effort 
choice of the others at the end of each one-shot game. (Any good survey?) This suggests he 
importance of the long-term relationship of workers and of their mutual obseryability. The 
recent literature on laboratory experiments on human cooperation also provides interesting 
implications. (See Dawes and Thaler (1988) for a survey.) Experiments identify several im-
portant conditions to derive cooperation; i  particular, the opportunity of discussion and the 
establishment of group identity. I think that organization structures and personnel policies of 
the firm can be designed to achieve such conditions.' Japanese firms", which are considered 
to have more cooperative workers, seem to have features compatible to those conditions: the 
"life-time employment," the encouragement of information sharing among members, fluid job 
demarcation, and work groups as functional units, and so on. 
   Collusion problems in agency settings have been analyzed by several economists, but most 
of the literature focuses on the collusion problem associated with the multiplicity of Nash 
equilibrium (Demski and Sappington, 1984; Ma, 1988; Ma, Moore and Turnbull, forthcoming; 
Mookherjee, 1984; Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1988). Tirole (1986) analyzes the collusion 
problem similar to this paper.' He considers a three-tier organization with an employer, a 
supervisor, and a worker. Given an initial wage contract, the worker observes an uncertain 
productivity parameter, and then selects effort. The supervisor can sometimes observe the 
true value of the parameter without any effort, and report it to the employer verifiably. Tirole 
assumes that any monetary side transfer between two parties can be costlessly written. Then 
he shows that though the firm can design initial contracts preventing any further side con-
 e In this respect, it is interesting to find that a sociologist Perrow (1986) criticizes agency 
theory for its exogenous assumption of individualistic preferences, and in turn treats this 
assumption as a variable to ask when self-interest behavior is likely to appear. He also believes 
that organization structures can affect workers' mode of behavior. 
 3 See also Tirole (1988) . 
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tracting, the possibility of the collusion between the supervisor and the worker reduces the net 
payoff to the employer. There are several contrasts between his paper and ours. He focuses 
on "vertical" collusion between the worker and the supervisor who has a better information 
structure than the employer. And he considers monetary side transfers between parties. In 
his model, however, what matters is the possibility of the detrimental collusion, which never 
occurs because the employer can prevent it by embodying any side contracting in the initial 
contract. This paper focuses on "lateral" collusion among workers who play subgames of ac-
tion choice. Collusion among workers is via some nonpecuniary side contracts on their choice 
of actions... And in our model, the employer sometimes wants worker collusion to occur, and 
thus the initial wage contract does not prevent it. 
   There is also a set of literature analyzing the interaction of workers in the firm by assuming 
that they have exogenously pecified interdependent preferences (Akerlof, 1982; Frank, 1984). 
In this paper we assume in contrast that the level of interactions is at workers' discretion, and 
because of this assumption, we can examine how the firm affects their discretion in order to 
achieve better interactions among workers from her point of view. 
   The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers collusion without interpersonal 
activities. Helping effort and socialization are introduced in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In 
Section 5 we discuss what makes cooperation likely, and how the firm can achieve cooperation.
               2. Collusion without Interpersonal Activities 
   This section presents the model of the relationship between the firm and two workers with 
no interpersonal activities. Extensions to the case of more than two workers are straightfor-
ward. In this section, the relation of the firm with each worker is exactly the one between 
a principal and one agent in the literature of standard agency theory with hidden action 
and without precontractual private information. We in particular follow the formulation by 
Grossman and Hart (1983). 
   The firm has two jobs and two workers indexed by n = 1, 2, and assigns worker n to job n. 
Worker n selects an effort level an E A where A is a compact set of feasible ffort levels. Effort 
an is expended only on his job n. The profit x" from job n depends on worker n's effort an 
and a noise term en through a production function r" = fn (an) en). Note that the production 








assume that the noise terms are stochastically independent.' Suppose that xn takes one of the 
Mn possible values 7ri < ... < it . For each outcome -i E In - { 1, ... , Mn, }, let P" (an) be 
the probability of xn = x!, induced by fn and the probability distribution of the error term. 
Let II" (an) = Es P" (an) 2rin be the expected profits from job n. 
   We assume that worker n has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the addi-
tively separable form, denoted by V n (w) -Gn (an), where w is the wage paid to him. Following 
standard models of principal-agent relationships, we assume that V n is strictly increasing and 
concave, and that Gn is strictly increasing: workers are (weakly) risk averse and effort averse. 
   The firm behaves as a Stackelberg leader to select a wage schedule for each worker. We 
assume that effort levels are publicly unobservable while realized profits from each job are 
publicly observable. Since there is no externality of effort and the profits are stochastically 
independent across jobs, the literature of relative performance evaluation tells us that the 
optimal wage schedule wn to worker n depends on xs only." We call such a wage scheme an 
independent scheme. Let win be the wage paid to worker n when xi is" observed. Given wage 
schedules, worker n chooses his effort level an to maximize his expected utility. Let U" (wn, .) 
be the expected utility of worker n, given his wage scheme wn = (w= )IE In . Clearly, Un (wn, •) 
depends on his effort an only. It is given as 
                 Un(wn,an) _ Pn(an)Vn(wi) - Gn(an)G 
iE In 
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral: The objective of the firm is to maximize the sum of 
the difference between the expected profit Hn (an) from job n and the expected wage payment 
>s P" (an) win to worker n. 
   Rather than state the firm's optimization problem directly, we utilize the Grossman-
Hart decomposition f the problem (Grossman and Hart, 1983) : We fix effort levels (a1, a2), 
and find wage schedules which implement them with least costs. We call this problem the 
implementation problem for (a1, a2)- Once the implementation problem is solved for each 
(a1, a2), the firm chooses the effort levels which maximize her expected profits minus the 
optimal expected wage payments. 
   Since the relation of each worker with the firm is completely independent of that of the 
other worker, we can consider the implementation problem for each worker separately. Let 
 4 See, for example, Holmstrom (1982) and Mookherjee (1984). 
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a
FVin = V n (win), and On be the inverse function of Vn . Then the implementation problem for 
an is given as follows: 
       min 1: P•" (an)on (Vs) 
                                    iE In 
subject to 
(IC) an E arg max E P" (a) vin - Gn (a) 
                                     a iEl
n 
(PC) ` P" (an) vi - Gn (an) > Un . 
                           iEXn 
The constraints (IC) represent incentive constraints. The constraints (PC) are the participa-
tion constraints: The expected utility of worker n must be at least as large as his reservation 
utility level U n. 
   The solution vn to the implementation problem is called the optimal wage schedule (in 
utility units) to worker n for the fixed effort level an. Let Cn (an) be the minimum cost to 
implement an, which is the optimal value of the implementation problem above. Then the 
firm chooses an to maximize Hn (an) - Cn (an) .
   The argument above implicitly assumes that given wage schedules, workers play a subgame 
of simultaneous effort choice noncooperatively to reach a Nash equilibrium of effort. It is under 
this assumption that the literature on relative performance evaluation shows the optimality of 
independent wage schedules. The effort choice subgame then becomes trivial: workers choose 
their effort levels independently asabove. 
   What if workers collude to play their effort choice subgame cooperatively? Whatever co-
operative play means, the effort choice of workers does not change as long as the firm designs 
independent, individual-based wage schemes. However, ealizing that workers play coopera-
tively, the firm may design different wage schedules, possibly interdependent ones. Then the 
question is whether the firm prefers workers to play noncooperatively or cooperatively. 
   To examine this question, assume that workers are completely identical: Each of them 
has an identical job with possible profits z-i for i E I = {1, ... , M}, the same technology 
Pi (a), the same utility function V (w) - G(a), and the same reservation utility level U. Then 








not innocuous: Introduction f asymmetry may cause aproblem, which will be discussed at 
the end of the section. We also assume that workers are strictly risk averse. 
   We assume that when workers play cooperatively, they choose some Pareto efficient effort 
pair via a binding agreement o  effort choice. How such a situation emerges is not our concern 
in this section: We simply assume that he firm can enforce worker collusion if she wants to do. 
Later in Section 5, I argue that whether workers play noncooperatively or cooperatively can 
depend greatly on organization design and personnel policies ofthe firm. Following convention, 
we formalize the workers' cooperative effort choice subgame asthey choose an effort pair to 
maximize a weighted sum of their expected utilities. Since we consider the symmetric situation, 
we simply assume that the weight on each worker's expected utility is the same ; . In other 
words, they choose their effort levels to maximize the (unweighted) sum of their expected 
utilities. To extend to the case of interdependent wage schemes, let w be the wage to 
worker nwhen the profits from job n and job k (k 0 n)5 are 7ri and 7ri, respectively, and let 
v = V (w j ). When workers collude, the optimal solution to the implementation problem for 
(a, a) solves 
                  min Pi (a) Pi (a) V .--A + c(v,2 ))                                     vl v~                            ' 
iEX JEI 
subject to 
(CIC) (a, a) E argmax~~Pi(a,)Pi(a2)(sv + lv It 2 ) - - G(ai) - zG(a2) 
                         alas iEX iEX
 (PC) 1: 1: Pi (a) Pj (a)v - G (a) > I~. 
                           iEX iEX 
 (CIC) is the abbreviation f the cooperative incentive constraints. The former incentive con-
 straints (IC) are, in contrast, called the Nash incentive constraints (NIC) hereafter. 
     Now we are ready to show the main result of this section. Given an effort pair and the 
 optimal wage scheme (for noncooperative workers),6 the following proposition shows that when 
 workers collude, the firm can implement he same effort pair with lower costs by designing an 
 appropriate interdependent wage scheme. 
   5 Whenever k and n appear together
, assume k : n.    6 
Since we do not solve the optimal scheme under worker collusion, the word "optimal" is 
 only used for the case in which workers play noncooperatively. 
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dProposition 2.1. Under the symmetric assumption as above, the firm prefers workers to 
collude to play cooperatively than noncooperatively. When workers collude and (a, a) are not 
the least costly effort levels, the firm selects an interdependent wage scheme. 
   The proof is in Appendix. What enables the new interdependent wage scheme (defined 
below by (2.1)) to achieve lower costs under worker collusion is (i) risk sharing between workers 
and (ii) the introduction of interpersonal i teraction. To see this point clearly, suppose that 
I = 11,21 and P2(-) is increasing. Then the optimal independent wage scheme (v1) v2) for 
(a, a), which are not least costly, satisfies vi < v2 n,and also by symmetry vs = v2 for i = 122. 
Define the new interdependent wage schedule (v1, v2) by 
                         v? = s v~ -+ ;v? . (2.1) 
Then v22 = va , vat =vie = ; (vi + v2) = s (vi + v2), and vi 1 = vi hold. In the original 
independent contract, each worker faces the following lottery; the higher wage n with prob-
ability P2 (a) and the lower wage vl with probability P1(a). Under the new interdependent 
scheme, the lottery changes to;va with probability (P2 (a))2 < P2 (a) and v1 with probabil-
ity (P1(a))2 <P1(a), and an intermediate wage ; (vi + v2) = s (va + vl) with probability 
2P2(a)P1(a). That is, risk is shared between workers 1 and 2 when the profits from two jobs 
are different: For example, when job 1 makes the higher profits 7r2 and job 2 the lower profits 
7r1, under the original contract, worker 1receives the higher wage and worker 2the lower 
wage, while under the new contract they receive the same intermediate wage. 
   The new incentive scheme (2.1) also introduces interaction between workers uch that 
when they collude, their risk sharing does not weaken workers' incentives to select the effort 
levels given. Under the new interdependent wage schemes, worker n's expected utility is given 
by 
                z EPi(an)Vin + s >Pj(ak)v~ - G(am). (2.2) 
                         =EZ ;EZ 
Thus, when they play noncooperatively under this new wage schedule, each worker finds 
his marginal utility on income with regard to his effort is half of that under the original 
independent scheme, so that they do not select (a, a). When they collude, however, they find 
that the sum of their expected utilities yields the same marginal utility on income with regard 







schedule. Thus, collusion and the new interdependent scheme lead workers to select (a, a) 
which the firm wants to implement. Also note that under the new scheme, workers are better 
off by colluding than by behaving noncooperatively. 
    The upshot is that when the relation among workers is completely independent , the firm 
prefers making workers collude and accordingly designing an interdependent wage schedule, 
which creates workers' interaction endogenously. Under such a scheme, workers care about co-
workers' behavior and choose the effort pair the firm wants to implement , with less risk imposed 
on workers than when they are treated separately under the independent wage schedule. 
Remarks: 
   (1) In Appendix, Proposition 2.1 is proved in a little more general case in which the noise 
terms are not stochastically independent but the optimal wage scheme is still an independent 
one. (See Mookherjee (1984) for such an example.) However, the result is not generally 
true if the optimal scheme isinterdependent because the risk sharing among collusive workers 
through the new wage scheme (2.1) cannot generally elicit the equilibrium effort levels chosen 
by workers behaving noncooperatively. For example, if workers' original wages are negatively 
correlated with each other as in the case of a tournament, the new scheme (2.1) leads both 
the winner and the loser to always receive some intermediate prize, so that even collusive 
workers have no incentive to select effort levels other than least costly ones. On the other 
hand, if workers' wages are positively correlated as in the case of team-based wage schemes 
(under which wages depend only on the sum of the profits from two jobs), the inter-worker 
risk sharing scheme (2.1) gives collusive workers the marginal utility-on-income with regard to 
each effort wice as high as that the original scheme gives to noncooperative workers. Thus, 
again, collusive workers do not select he same effort levels. In the next section, we examine a 
specific form of production externalities. The argument there can be applied to more general 
cases in which interdependent wage schemes are optimal. We will show that a different way of 
improving risk sharing can lead the firm to prefer collusion in symmetric situations ifworkers' 
optimal wages are perfectly positively correlated. 
   (2) The proof of Proposition 2.1 heavily depends on the symmetry assumption. Without 
symmetry, the proof is still valid if (i) the weight on each worker's expected utility is the same; 
(ii) V1 = V2; and (iii) (a1,a2) which the firm attempts to implement satisfy U1 + G1 (a,) 
_ 
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1
U + G2(a2). Conditions (i) and (ii) are utilized to show that the -new interdependent wage 
scheme r duces the firm's expected payments byimproving the risk sharing. Condition (iii) 
can be dropped if we weaken the participation constraints (PC) to 
                   U1(wl,al,a2)+U2(w2,a2,ai) > U1 +U2• 
The constraint states that the sum of workers' expected utilities must be at least as large as 
the sum of their eservation utility levels. This constraint may be reasonable if we assume, in 
addition to a binding agreement o  effort choice, the feasibility ofutility transfers via some 
binding pecuniary ornonpecuniary side contracting between workers.
                    3. Effort Allocation and Collusion 
   In this section, we introduce a specific form of production externalities as an example 
of a productive interpersonal behavior. We continue to assume the symmetry between two 
workers. Each worker is strictly risk averse, and chooses a two-dimensional effort vector 
en = (an ,bn) E A X B - [Os A ] x [0$ B ] with A > 0 and B > 0. The first element an $ called his 
own effort, is the same as the effort in the last section: it is expended on his job. The second 
element bn is called his helping effort which affects the job occupied by the other worker k. 
Thus, the probability that the profits from job n is iri is now a function of an and bk, written 
as Pi (an, bk). The expected profits from job n is also written as II (an ,bk) . To ease notations, 
let Pi, (en, ek) = Pi (an, bk)Pi (ak, bn) be the joint probability of am = ari and ark = ark . The 
disutility of each worker is a function of his own effort and his helping effort. For simplicity, 
we assume that it depends on the sum of these two effort levels, written as G (an + bn) : For 
example, an and bn represent the time allocated to worker n's own job and the other job, 
respectively, and he cares only about the total amount of time he works. This assumption 
makes the exposition i  this section simpler, although the results do not depend on it. 
   For an expository reason, we assume I = { 1, 2}: There are two possible outcomes of each 
job. Let plan, bk) be the probability that job n makes profit are . Since are > A-1, P(an2bA;) is 
the probability of "success" injob n while 1 - plan, bk) is the probability of "failure." 
   We employ the following assumptions throughout this section. 
Assumption 3.1. (i) p(a, b) is strictly increasing and strictly. concave ina and b. (ii) p(a, b) E 
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(0,1) for all (a, b). (iii) G(t) is strictly increasing and convex. (iv) The firm always wants to 
implement e = (a, b) with a E (0, A) and b < B. 
   Some xplanation ofeach assumption follows. Assumption (i) implies that both own effort 
and helping effort are productive with decreasing returns. Under our two-outcome assumption, 
this also implies that the probability distribution satisfies the strict monotone likelihood ratio 
property. Assumption (ii) implies that there is no moving support. Assumption (iii) is a 
standard one implying` that workers are effort averse. Finally, Assumption (iv) excludes the 
case in which effort levels reach upper bounds, or the case where only helping effort is positive. 
   This section utilizes the first-order approach. We assume that p(.) and G(.) are twice 
continuously differentiable. Itoh (1988) shows that the following assumption is sufficient for 
the first-order approach to be valid. 
Assumption 3.2. Either one of the following (a) and (b) holds. (a) P11(el, e2) is convex in 
en, for n = 1, 2, and c' (v) is convex. (b) P22 (e1, e2) is concave in e„ for n = 1, 2, and ci' (v) is 
concave. 
   In particular, the convexity of q' holds when the measure of absolute risk aversion is 
increasing, constant, or decreasing relatively slowly in income. Utility functions which are 
frequently used in examples, such as exponential, ogarithmic, or square root, satisfy it. Also 
the assumption on the joint probability implies that p(e) is concave in e. 
   The following lemma holds under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. It shows that the optimal 
wage schedule ismonotone increasing, and that it is an independent one (an interdependent 
one) when the firm wants workers not to help (when she wants workers to help, respectively). 
See Itoh (.1988) for the proof. 
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that workers play the effort choice game noncooperatively. (i) If the 
firm wants to implement e = (a, 0) for each worker, the optimal wage schedule isan indepen-
dent one satisfying v2> v1. (ii) If the firm wants to implement e = (a, b) with b > 0 for each 
worker, the optimal wage schedule is an interdependent one satisfying vie > vi1 and v2i > vii 
for i=1,2. 
   We call e = (a, b) effort allocation efficient (E.A.E.) if (a, b) maximizes the winning prob-
ability p(a', b') on the indifferent curve G(a' + b') = G(a + b) or a' + b' = a + b. It is easily 
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shown that e = (a, b) with b >• 0is E.A.E. if and only if pa (a, b) = pb (a, b) and that e = (a, 0) 
is E.A.E. if and only if pa (a, 0) > pb (a, 0) holds, where the subscripts represent partial deriva-
tives. Figure 3.1 shows the path of E.A.E. pairs of effort. By Assumption 3.1 (i), each isoquant 
of p(-) is strictly convex and decreasing. Thus, for each t > 0, there xists a. unique E.A.E. 
effort pair, denoted by e(t) = (a(t), b(t)), such that a(t) + b(t) = t. 
   If e' _ (a', b') with b' > 0 satisfies pb < pa so that a' < a(a' + b') and b' > b(a' + b') hold, 
we say that e' exhibits over-cooperation. By shifting helping effort to own effort along the 
indifference urve, the success probability could increase. Similarly, if e" = (a", b") satisfies 
pb > pa, we say that e" exhibits under-cooperation. The following lemma is proved in Itoh 
(1988).
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that workers play the effort choice game noncooperatively. (i) If e is 
E.A.E., the optimal wage schedule for e satisfies v12 = v21. (ii) If e exhibits under-cooperation 
(over-cooperation), theoptimal wage schedule satisfies v12 < (>)v21. 
   The lemma shows the relation between effort allocation and risk allocation- between two 
jobs. When the firm wants to implement an E.A.E. effort pair, she must allocate risk imposed 
on each worker equally between his job and the other job. This is achieved by paying the 
same wage v12 = v21 when one job is success and the other is failure, regardless ofwhich job 
succeeds and which job fails. In other words, the firm pays wages depending only on the sum 
of the profits from two jobs: The wage scheme iscompletely team-based. To induce workers to 
under-cooperate, thefirm imposes more risk on him through the outcome of his job than the 
other job (v2i - v11 > V12- vil for i = 1, 2). The similar argument holds for over-cooperation 
as well. 
   Now we compare the solution as above with that under worker collusion. For the compar-
ison, we provide the first-order conditions for workers to select e = (a, b) given a wage scheme 
when they play noncooperatively. When b = 0, the optimal (independent) wage scheme 
v = (v1) v2) satisfies the incentive constraints
p. (a, 0) [v2- vi 
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(3.1)
On the other hand, if b > 0, the optimal wage scheme is interdependent and satisfies (NIC): 
                  Pa (e) [(v21 - vii) + P(e)A] = G' (a + b) 
                 Pb(e)[(v12 - vii) +P(e)a] = G'(a + b) (3.2) 
where A = v22 + v11 v21 - v12 . When workers collude, supposing that they maximize the 
sum of their expected utilities, the optimal contract v satisfies the following (CIC). 
           Pa (e) Kv21 - vl l } + p(e)a + (v12 - vll) + p(e)a] = G' (a + b) 
                                                            (3.3) 
           Pb (e)[(v12 -1)11) + p(e}0 + (V21 - 011) + p(e)AA < G' (a + b) 
A where A = v22 + v11 - v12 - v21 and the inequality is strict only if b '= 0. From (3.3), we 
immediately obtain the following result. 
Proposition 3.1. When workers collude to play cooperatively, the firm can implement only 
E.A.E. pairs.
   The reason is that unequal risk allocation between two jobs for a worker is canceled out 
by the unequal risk allocation for the other worker. Thus, their cooperative ffort choice is 
always based on equal risk allocation between two jobs in total. 
   Because of Proposition 3.1, the result in the last section applies only to E.A.E. effort 
pairs. When e = (a, 0) is E.A.E., the optimal wage scheme is independent. The proof of 
Proposition 2.1 then applies and shows that the firm prefers workers to collude to choose 
(a, 0) because of the risk sharing among them through the new wage scheme (2.1). However, 
if pa (a, 0) a pb (a, 0) so that e = (a, 0) exhibits under-cooperation, collusive workers cannot 
implement this because they reduce own effort and exert positive helping effort to select some 
E.A.E. effort pair.' 
   When e = (a, b) with b > 0 is E.A.E., the optimal wage scheme is interdependent. Then 
the new wage scheme defined by (2.1) gives collusive workers too much marginal utility on 
  7 There is one way to implement such under-cooperated (a, 0): physical isolation of workers. 
By isolation the firm can enforce zero help. Then by designing an appropriate interdependent 
wage scheme, the firm can induce collusive workers to select any (a, 0) with lower costs than 
when they behave noncooperatively. However, how can the firm simultaneously isolate workers 
and induce them to play cooperatively? These two policies do not seem to be compatible. 
Later in Section 4, we again consider isolation when nonproductive interpersonal activities 
exist. There isolation without collusion may be an attractive alternative for the firm. 
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income with regard to each effort: If we substitute v~; = s (vt, + v,) = vs, in (3.3), the left-
hand side is twice as high as that in (3.2), so that collusive workers do not select he specific 
E.A.E. pair e. The next proposition presents a different way to construct a desirable wage 
schedule for collusive workers. The proof is in Appendix. 
Proposition 3.2. When the firm wants to implement an E.A.E. effort pair, she prefers work-
ers to collude to play cooperatively because of the improvement in risk sharing. 
   When the E.A.E. effort pair e (a, b) the firm wants to implement has a positive helping 
effort level, she designs the following new wage scheme under worker collusion. 
                    v=; _ ;vi; +;(U+G(a+b)) (3.4) 
The original scheme (v13) pays workers equal wages in each outcome. Thus, when workers 
collude under (vi,), the marginal utility on income with regard to each effort is twice as high 
as that when they behave noncooperatively. Thus, the new wage scheme (3.4) simply reduces 
the variation of wages to half of that of (v13) such as to satisfy (PC). This reduction of risk does 
not weaken i centive effects when workers collude. And the firm's expected payments are lower 
because of the improvement i  risk sharing. Note the difference between (2.1) and (3.4). When 
the optimal scheme is independent, the firm requires creating interactions between collusive 
workers by introducing interdependence in wage schemes. On the other hand, when the 
optimal scheme is interdependent such that workers' wages are perfectly positively correlated 
as above, no additional interaction is necessary. 
   The foregoing argument can be extended to more general cases in which both correlation 
in noise terms and any form of production externalities exist. In particular, if team production 
exists o that only the sum of the profits from two jobs can be monitored, the wage scheme 
similar to the one defined by (3.4) can implement the effort pair given with lower costs by 
improving risk sharing. When the profit from each job can be monitored separately, the 
firm can achieve t chnologically efficient effort combinations by wage schemes which make 
workers' wages perfectly positively correlated with each other.' Then the firm who pursues 
such efficiency prefers worker collusion as shown above. The risk sharing advantage of worker 
  8 In the two-outcome odel, only perfectly positively correlated wage schemes can achieve 
allocation efficiency. When each job has more than two outcomes, team-based linear wage 
schedules attain efficient effort combination. See Drago and Turnbull (1988) who show that, 
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collusion cannot be applied to other kinds of wage schemes. In particular, if workers' wages 
are negatively correlated with each other as in the case of a tournament, we cannot reduce the 
risk imposed on each worker without altering their incentives to select effort. In the symmetric 
situation, collusion under tournaments only lead workers to select least costly effort levels, so 
that worker collusion is detrimental.
                4. "Human Relations" through Socialization 
    In this section, we introduce a nonproductive interpersonal activities called socialization 
into the basic model in Section 2. Worker n chooses his own effort level and a level of 
socialization (an, s.) E A x S. The level of socialization does not affect he probability 
distributions on outcomes of workers' jobs. Instead, it comes into their disutility functions. 
Throughout this section, we assume that workers have an identical disutility function G(.): 
Worker n's disutility is written as G(an) 8n) 8k) .
   Because socialization does not affect the probability distribution of the outcome of either 
job, the optimal wage schedule to worker n is independent of the outcome of job k: If (pin.) 
implements (an) sn)n_1,2, then the new wage schedule (Din) defined by vs P, (an)Vin, for 
each i can implement the same effort and socialization levels with lower costs by improving 
risk sharing between the firm and worker n. Thus, hereafter in this section, we can consider 
wage schedules toworker n which are independent of the outcome of job k. This excludes the 
risk sharing advantage ofcollusion analyzed in the previous two sections, and so we can focus 
on a different aspect of worker collusion. 
   This observation implies that the firm cannot directly control the levels of socialization 
workers choose by designing wage schemes: The firm selects wage schedules only to implement 
particular effort levels, taking into consideration the effect of workers' interaction through 
socialization on effort levels they choose. The objective of this section is to examine how the 
firm can affect workers' choice of socialization levels in order to reduce the cost of implementing 
a particular pair of effort (an) ak). We hence assume for simplicity that each worker chooses 
either a high level of effort or a low level. We let A _ { h, I } with h > 1. We assume that 
for each n, IIn (h) >> IIn (l): the expected profits under the high level of effort are much 
in the similar model of production externalities, where the profits have a continuous proba-
bility distribution, group-based piece rate schemes elicit E.A.E. effort pairs. However, other 
nonlinear wage schemes may possibly achieve such efficiency. 
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larger than those under the low level of effort, so that the firm always wants to implement 
(ai, a2) = (h) h). 
   Let the set of feasible socialization levels S be an interval [0,S] with S > 0. Let 
Gh. (8n) Sk) = G (h, 'Sn , 8k) and Gl (Sn ,Sk) = G (l) Sn ) 8k). We introduce several. assumptions 
on these disutility functions. First, since workers are effort averse, we have the following 
assumption. 
Assumption 4.1. For all (Sn ,Sk ), Gh, (Sn, Sk) > Gl (Sn ,Sk) .
   We next assume that the disutility of effort of a worker decreases at a .decreasing rate as 
a level of socialization from his co-worker increases. 
Assumption 4.2. Gh (8n, sk) and G, (Sn, sk) are strictly decreasing and convex in sk. 
   Are workers unwilling to increase socialization for co-workers? I believe that this is true 
for sufficiently high levels of socialization. For low levels of socialization, however, worker 
n's increasing his socialization level may not raise his disutility: He may be indifferent in 
his socialization level or he may even derive some "social pleasure" from reducing his co-
worker's disutility. Thus, we state the following two assumptions separately: the assumption 
of no social pleasure- where the disutility of a worker is nondecreasing in his socialization; and 
the assumption of social pleasure in which his disutility decreases at a decreasing rate in his 
socialization for small socialization levels. However, most results that follow hold under either 
assumption.9 
Assumption 4.3a. (No social pleasure.) Gh (sn, 9k) and G, (sn , sk) are nondecreasing i  sn . 
Assumption 4.3b. (Existence of social pleasure.) For each sk, there exist i ands in the in-
terval (0, S) such that Gh (sn, 8k) is strictly decreasing and convex in Sn E [0, s) and Gl (Sn, 8,k) 
is strictly decreasing and convex in 8n E 10,S). 
    Whether or not social pleasure exists, we assume that for sufficiently high levels of social-
ization, workers dislike giving more socialization to co-workers. In addition, we assume that 
the disutility increases at an increasing rate for such socialization levels. 
  9 These two assumptions have a different effect on the comparison between isolation and 
noncooperative behavior, as we will see later in an example. 
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Assumption 4.4. For each sk, there xist s and s' in [0, S) such that Gh (Sn, sk) is strictly 
increasing and strictly convex ins,, > s and G, (sn, 8k) is strictly increasing and strictly convex 
in sn>8'. 
   We draw typical graphs of the disutility function without and with social pleasure in 
Figures 4.1a and 4.1b, respectively. 
    We next assume that both Gh and G, are continuously differentiable in sn and 8k and 
define 
                  Qh (sk) = max{s E S s E arg min Gh (s', sk) } 
                  or, (sk) = max{s E S ~_s E arg min G, (s', sk)). 
These functions are well defined and continuous by assumptions. The definition implies that 
oh and or, are the worker's best responses to socialization sk from the other worker when 
the former worker's effort level is h and 1, respectively. When several values are possible, we 
assume that a worker chooses the highest level of socialization that minimizes the disutility of 
the other worker. 
    The next two assumptions characterize the workers' best responses. We assume that 
a worker is more unwilling to increase socialization the harder he works, or the lower his 
co-worker's socialization level is. These assumptions seem to be quite reasonable. 
Assumption 4.5. For each sk ands > s', Gh (s, sk) - . Gh (s', sk) > G, (s, sk) - Gi (s', sk). The 
inequality isstrict over the range where Gh (•, 8k) is strictly increasing. 
Assumption 4.6. Forsn > s', and 8k > ak, Gh(sn,ak)-Gh(s' ,8k) > Gh(8n,sk)-Gh(S', 8k) 
holds. The same inequality holds for Gd (•) as well. 
   By Assumptions 4.5 and 4.6, we can show that a worker increases his socialization when 
he works less hard or when his co-worker provides more socialization. The proofs are in 
Appendix. 
Lemma 4.1. (i) Assumption 4.5 implies that for each 8k, 0h (sk) < Ql (sk ); (ii) Assumption 
4.6 implies that both oh (sk) and o (sk) are nondecreasing  sk. 
   We assume that for each (an, ak) E A', there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of social-
ization.10 Let sxy (x, y = h, 1) be a worker's equilibrium socialization when his effort level is x 
 io See Friedman (1986) for some sufficient 'conditions for this to be true. 
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1
4
and his co-worker's level is y. 'By definition, shh = 0h (Shh ), Shl = ah (Sth ), Slh = al (Sht ), and 
Sit = Oj-(slt). The next lemma provides ome partial order of these four levels of equilibrium 
socialization. See Appendix for the proof. 
Lemma 4.2. shh < shl < sit and shh < slh < sit hold. Also sit < S holds.
   This lemma shows that a worker's equilibrium socialization is higher the less hard he 
or his co-worker works. For example, consider the equilibrium (s,,, S2) = (shh, Shh). When 
worker 2 decreases his effort level from h to 1, then with s, = shh fixed, worker 2 increases 
his socialization from shh by Lemma 4.1 (i), which change leads to an increase in worker 
1's socialization from shh by Lemma 4.1 (ii). This process converges to the new equilibrium 
(Sht ) Sth) which has higher levels of socialization of both workers than those in the original 
equilibrium." 
i 
   These equilibrium socialization levels are clearly inefficient: The workers could have 
achieved Pareto superior socialization given effort levels. To see this, note that both Gh (sn, sk ) 
and Gi (sn, sk) are smooth and convex in sn and sk . Thus, for each x, y = h, 1, at the equilib-
rium (8n, sk) = (sxy) sys ), the partial derivatives ofGh (sn, sk) and Gi (sn, sk) with regard to 
Snare zero. The marginal increase from sxy hence does not raise worker n's disutility while it 
strictly decreases the other worker's disutility. This is true for worker k as well. Thus, work-
ers could have achieved lower disutility levels by simultaneously increasing their socialization 
levels. This under-socialization is certainly costly to the firm as well. If workers' disutility 
levels were lower, the expected payments in utility units which implement given effort levels 
would also be lower. 
   In particular, this implies that the first-best solution (which is the solution when the firm 
can monitor each agent's choice of effort and socialization level perfectly) cannot be achieved 
even when workers are risk neutral. This is in contrast with the standard models of principal-
agent relationships without precontractual private information where the principal can achieve 
the first-best solution by paying the whole marginal profits to each agent. This is also true in 
the model in Section 3. 
   The first-best solution is defined as- follows. Suppose that effort and socialization levels 
 ii See de Groote (1988) and Lippman et al. (1987) for more general results. 
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are publicly observable, and define for x = h, 1, 
                     CFB(x,8n,8k) = on (U +G.,(Sn,sk)) 
Then the firm can implement (h, 8n )n=1,2 by paying a fixed wage CFB (h, 8n, sk) to worker n if 
workers choose (h, sn)n=1,2, and by paying a sufficiently small wage otherwise." Let (81* ) 82*) 
be the first-best socialization. Since we assume that (h, h) is the first-best effort, 
2 
             (h,Sr*a)n=1,2 E arg maX {IIt1(an) -CFB (fin Sn Sk) }• (4.1) 
                                                a3L,a2,a1 ,a2 
n=1 
In particular, the first-best ocial transfers ( *,, s2) solve 
                    min CFB (h, s,, 82) + C'FB (h) 82)81). 
                                    a1ia2ES 
When workers are risk neutral, this is equivalent to minimizing Gh (s) s). Suppose that the 
solution is unique and denote it by shh . Then by the previous argument, we have 8hh > shh 
In summary, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.1. The first-best solution cannot be achieved when risk neutral workers play 
noncooperatively 
   On the other hand, when workers collude to choose their levels of socialization coopera-
tively, the firm can achieve the first-best olution. Given (h, h), cooperative workers select 
                (81) 82) E arg min Gh($1,82) +Gh(82,si) 
                                                        al+a2 
which yields (8hh, 8hh). Assume without loss of generality V n (w) = w and define the wage 
contract to worker n by 
                                         Win* -in - Fn 
where Fn = In (h) - U - Gh (8hh, 8hh) •Then the firm obtains the fixed residual profits equal 
to the net profits under the first-best solution. And the expected utility of worker n is given 
by 
                   Un (an) 8n) 8k) = l1n (an) - G (an) 8n) 8k) - Fn • (4.2) 
 12 Some additional assumptions are generally required to ensure that the firm can implement 
(h, sn )n-1,2 by the payment which guarantees workers exactly their reservation utility level. 
See Grossman and Hart (1983). 
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e
  Since (h, h) is the first-best effort levels, by (4.1), given (s,,, sk) _ (shh' shh ), each worker 
  chooses a,, = h in their self-interests. And given (h, h), workers elect (shh) shh) cooperatively: 
  Other possible choice of workers, if any, cannot increase (4.2) because of the definition of the 
  first-best solution in (4.1). Finally, when each worker chooses (h, shh), his expected utility is 
   exactly his reservation utility level. Thus, we have the following. 
   Proposition 4.2. Suppose that workers are risk neutral. If they choose their levels of social-
   ization cooperatively, then the firm can achieve the first-best solution by paying each worker 
  the whole marginal profits from his job. 
       When workers are risk averse, however, whether- worker collusion is better or not is not 
   clear. To see this, we turn to the firm's problem. Assuming that the firm wants to implement 
   (ai, a2) _ (h, h) and workers do not collude, she solves the following implementation problem. 
              min E Pl(h)0i(v,) + > P?(h)~2(v? ) 
                                            V1,V2 
                            iEh jEI2 
   subject o, for each n = 1) 2, 
  (NIC) P'(h)vi'. - Gh(Shh) shh) > P4(I)vv - G1(Slh)shh) 
                      iEX,. iEI„
(PC) Pin (h) vin - Gh (shh ) shh) >- U -
                             iE I,, 
The Nash incentive constraint for worker n states that given worker k's choice (h, shh), worker 
n has no incentive to reduce ffort from h to I and accordingly tochange his socialization from 
shh to s1h . Since all the constraints hold with equality at the optimum, the optimal solution 
(vt) satisfies the following two equations for each worker: 
                (Pn (h) - Pin (1))vi = Gh(Shh, Shh) - Gl (S!h, shh); (4.3) 
                 iEl„ 
                    E Pn (h) vin = U + Gh (Shh) Shh ). (4.4) 
                           iEX„ 
   Equation (4.4) shows that the smaller the disutility level of worker n at the optimum is, the 
smaller is the firm's expected payments in utility units. Equation (4.3) states that, assuming 
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that the right-hand side is positive, at the optimum the increase in worker n's expected utility 
on income by raising his effort from 1 to h is equal to the increase inhis disutility by the 
same change of his effort level and the corresponding change in his socialization, given his 
co-worker's equilibrium choice fixed." 
  Let s*,, be defined by 
                   (s~ , sYs) = arg min G. (sn, sk) + Gy (sk, 8n) 
                                                             8n,8k 
for x, y = h, 1. We assume the uniqueness of each sx , When workers collude to choose 
socialization levels, given their effort choice (x, y), they select he socialization (s*r, s*                                                                   Yz). 
To exclude the possibility of risk sharing among workers, suppose that wage schemes are 
independent sothat collusive workers elect heir effort levels independently. Then by the 
argument similar to the case of noncooperative behavior, the optimal solution (vi) for collusive 
workers satisfies 
                (Pin (h) - Pin (1))vi = Gh (8hh I shh) - G, (sth, 8hh); (4.5) 
                      -iEl
n 
                        Pin (h) on = U + Gh (8hh, 8hh )' (4.6) 
                          iEln 
Since Gh(shh,8hh) < Gh(shh,8hh), the firm pays smaller expected payments in utility units 
when workers collude than not. Thus, if the marginal disutility of effort in (4.5) is smaller 
than that in (4.3), then we can conclude that the firm prefers worker collusion. However, 
this is not necessarily true. Smaller disutility and smaller marginal disutility have no logical 
connection here. 14 
   We analyze the case of risk averse workers by an example. The example shows that 
how a worker's marginal disutility of effort is affected by his co-worker's socialization level is 
important for collusion to be preferred by the firm. In the example, we assume that the harder 
a worker works, the larger the effect of socialization from his co-worker is. In other words, 
workers are less effort averse when they receive more socialization from co-workers. 
 1S Here we ignore the problem associated with multiple Nash equilibria. If (an, sn) _ (1, 8« )
for each n is also an equilibrium given (v1, v2 ), then this equilibrium yields higher expected 
utilities to workers. We consider this problem explicitly in the example analyzed below. 
 14 When we assume that collusive workers choose their effort levels as well as their
, socializa-
tion levels cooperatively, the risk sharing argument comes in. Collusion is hence more likely 
to be preferred by the firm. However, the same problem remains. 
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Assumption 4.7. For each s;,, and 8 > 8', Gh (Sn, S') - Gh (Sn, S) > Gt (sn, s') - Gl (sn, s). 
   We assume that the disutility functions of workers are given by the following quadratic 
functions: For 'sn , sk E S = [ 0,1 ] , 
                  Gh (sn ) 8k) _ ; 8(1 - 8k)2 - s Sn Sic + z 82 
n 
                  Gt (Sn 8k) = s al l - St c)2 - s sn (sk + 7) + .2L sn
We assume 0 > A and 0 < 7 < a . Then these disutility functions satisfy the assumptions stated 
above. In particular, workers derive social pleasure for low levels of socialization. (Assumption 
4.3b is adopted.) 
   The best response functions are calculated asah (8k) _ ; sk and at (sic) = s (sk + 7) . These 
functions provide the equilibrium socialization as follows: Shh = 0; Sit = 27; Sht = s7; and 
sih = ,-y. The marginal disutility of effort in (4.3) is then calculated as
                 Gh (shh) Shh) - Gl (8th, Shh) = s (8 - A) + 9 72 • (4.7) 
It is increasing in 0 - A and 7 because higher values of these parameters lead to a larger 
difference in disutility between a = I and a = h. 
   We have to exclude the .case where given the optimal wage scheme for (h, h), there exists 
the other equilibrium (1,1) with (sit, sit). Otherwise, workers elect more preferable (1,1). The 
sufficient condition is 
                Pin (l)vs - Gt(sit,sit) < P"(h)vs - Gh(Sht)Sit) 
                  iEl„ iEl,1 
or by (4.3), 
              Gh(8hh) 8hh) - Gh(Sht,Su) >Gt(8th,8hh) - Gt(slt,sit). (4.8) 
Loosely speaking, the condition holds when a worker's degree of effort aversion is affected 
sufficiently more by socialization from his co-worker (via Assumption 4.7) than by his own 
socialization level (Assumption 4.5). In the example, this means that 0 - A is sufficiently larger 
than 7. A simple calculation shows that (4.8) is equivalent to
                           0- A> 117 (4.9)                 36(  - 7) 
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    Next we turn to collusive choice of socialization. A calculation shows that in this example, 
sY = 1 holds for z, y = h, 1: For each effort pair, the level of socialization selected by collusive 
workers is exactly the upper bound. Under independent wage schemes, the marginal disutility 
of effort in (4.5) is given by 
                       Gh (1,1) - G1(1,1) = s 7• (4.10) 
It is increasing in 7 with the rate ; , which is higher than the rate 9 in (4.7). On the other 
hand, (4.7) is more affected by 9 - A than (4.1.0). (That (4.10) does not depend on 9 - A is 
an artifact of the example.) This is because l vels of socialization are higher under collusion 
than under noncooperative behavior. 
   Since Gh (1, 1) < Gh (shh, shh), if the value in (4.10) is smaller than that in (4.7), collusion 
is better than noncooperative behavior. The condition is given by 
                             9- A? 'y(1 - 19-Y). (4.11) 
However, this condition is not sufficient for collusion to be the best: The firm can also control 
workers' socialization by isolating them. Isolation can enforce zero socialization and may 
reduce the marginal disutility of effort. 
   In fact., in this example, isolation is better than noncooperative behavior: The marginal 
disutility of effort under isolation is given by 
            Gh (0, 0) - G,(0;0) = s (9 - A). (4.12) 
In addition, Since shh = 0, Gh (shh, shh) = Gh (0, 0). Isolation hence leads to the same level 
of the disutility and the lower marginal disutility of effort. The superiority of isolation results 
from two properties of the example: shh = 0 and the existence of social pleasure. Although 
the level of disutility is generally higher under isolation than noncooperative behavior, the 
first property equates these disutility levels. When social pleasure exists, deviation from h to 
1- under isolation becomes less attractive toworkers since G`(0,0) is higher than when there 
is no social pleasure. In the example, no social pleasure means that G, (s„ , sk) is equal to 
G, (ul (sk ), sk) for an < o (ak). Then 
                  Gh(0) 0) - G,(s'1) 0) = s (9 - A) + a72• (4.13) 
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Equilibrium socialization levels do not change under no social pleasure. Thus, by (4.7), when 
social pleasure does not exist, isolation is worse than noncooperative b havior. In fact, this 
is a general result: If there exists no social pleasure (Assumption 4.3a), isolation cannot be 
better than noncooperative behavior." 
    Under the existence ofsocial pleasure, collusion is hence the best if (4.10) is not larger 
than (4.12), that is, 
                                 e- A > 7. (4.14) 
On the other hand, collusion is best under no social pleasure if (4.11) holds. Both conditions 
(4.11) and (4.14) satisfy (4.9) so that there is no problem associated with multiple Nash 
equilibria. In either case, collusion is more likely to be optimal the higher 0 - A or the lower 
-y is. A sufficiently high 8 - A or low ry implies that the increase of socialization by collusion 
(8hh > 8hh) reduces the other's marginal disutility of effort (via Assumption 4.7) sufficiently 
more than it raises the own marginal disutility (via Assumption 4.5). Whether such a condition 
is satisfied or not will depend on job characteristics and. workers' personalities to some extent. 
Besides them, however, it seems more likely to be satisfied when workers hare their work floors 
and so their friendly relationship is important than when their tasks are more individualistic 
as professional ones. 
                               5. Discussions 
    The previous ections identify cases where the firm prefers worker collusion in the sym-
metric situation as follows: 
  1. When workers have no interaction and an independent wage contract is employed, the 
    firm is better off by enforcing worker collusion and designing an interdependent wage 
    scheme, which creates interaction among workers and enables them to share risks among 
    themselves. 
 15 There is another case in which isolation may be better than noncooperative b havior. 
Suppose that workers behave noncooperatively as follows: workers first select heir effort levels 
simultaneously, and after observing each other's effort choice they choose their socialization 
levels. Then the marginal disutility of effort changes to Gh (shh) Shh) - Gc (81h) Shl ), which 
is larger than (4.3): Since the effort choice of a worker can affect he other worker's choice 
of socialization, the deviation from h to 1 becomes easier. Then it turns out that in our 
example isolation is better than noncooperative behavior even under the assumption of no 
social pleasure. 
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 2. When workers' relationship is interrelated through production externalities, the firm can 
    attain technologically efficient effort combination by designing team-based wage schemes. 
   Then worker collusion allows her to improve risk sharing by reducing the risk imposed on 
    each worker. 
 3. If team production exists so that only the sum of the profits from all the jobs is observable, 
    the firm prefers worker collusion by the same reason as 2. 
 4. When workers interact with each other through nonproductive interpersonal activities 
   such as socialization, worker collusion results. in higher and efficient levels of socialization 
    than noncooperative behavior does. When workers are risk neutral, this fact allows the 
   firm to achieve the first-best solution only under worker collusion. . 
    Some characteristics of the stylized Japanese firm are similar to those summarized above: 
Many observers find that in the Japanese firm, responsibility for decisions is shared among 
team members and employees are engaged in much higher levels of socialization. (See Lincoln 
and McBride (1987) for a survey and references of qualitative and quantitative comparative 
researches. The evidences for most of the characteristics of the Japanese firm that we discuss 
in this section have been found in this survey.) Since neither such risk sharing nor high levels 
of socialization seems to lead Japanese workers to exert low effort levels, worker collusion is 
likely to be prevailing in Japanese organizations. 
   Then the question is: Why do Japanese workers collude to make decisions cooperatively? 
Culturalists'. answer will be group-oriented attributes of Japanese. I do not intend to reject 
this view. However, I would like to argue that organization structures and personnel policies 
of the stylized Japanese firm are also designed so as to elicit worker collusion. 
   Economists' explanation ofcooperation by self-interested agents involves repetition of a 
one-shot decision making situation. Loosely speaking, the literature on repeated games hows 
that cooperation can be achieved as a perfect Nash equilibrium.of the repeated game if the 
one-shot game is repeated sufficiently many times and players discount heir future payoffs 
sufficiently small. See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986a) and Kreps et al. (1982). 
Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu et al. (1986) remind us that perfect monitoring is impor-
tant for the result above. (See also Kreps (1984).) If neither worker can observe his co-workers' 
choice after each stage game, then cooperation must sometimes break down. Fudenberg and 
Maskin (1986c) and Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986) in fact show that in such a situa-




tion, equilibrium average payoffs are generally bounded away from the Pareto frontier of the 
one-shot game.16 
   The practice of the "lifetime mployment" in Japan will guarantee long-term relationships 
among regular workers. It is also the case that there are far more opportunities for interper-
sonal contacts in Japanese firms than its Western counterparts. These features enable workers 
to reciprocate cooperative l vels of effort, help, or socialization. more easily. In addition, fluid 
job classifications and the practice of frequent job rotations will facilitate the mutual moni-
toring of workers. Kagono et al. (1985) conclude from their survey research that information 
sharing and interpersonal interactions are important organizing methods of Japanese firms. 
   The literature on human cooperation identifies other factors to derive cooperation. (See 
Dawes and Thaler (1988) for a survey and references.) It is typical that cooperation can be 
observed even in one-shot experiments. And some experiments find that cooperation rates 
are high when discussion is allowed before the decision and each subject is told that his/her 
cooperation improves the welfare of the other members in the team to which he/she belongs, 
rather than those in the other. team. The importance of this "group identity" is • particularly 
interesting since it is now well known that work groups are more important bases of Japanese 
organizations than occupational. positions. (See. Aoki (1989) as well as those cited above.) 
Though economics annot provide any explanation for this experimental result, the emphasis 
on work groups as functional units seems to be the most important device to elicit worker 
collusion. 
   Though we focused on. the benefits of Japanese practices as devices to encourage cooper-
ation, the policies discussed above may introduce costs as well. Tirole (1986) fully discusses 
the costs of long-term relationships (the possibility of detrimental collusion). Fluid job de-
marcation and teamwork are likely to create team production, which in turn leads the firm to 
prefer worker collusion. Team production however makes it hard to identify the contribution 
of each worker. Thus, whether to introduce teamwork or an unambiguous division of labor 
must be examined. (See Itoh (1988) for a preliminary work.) Finally, the emphasis on group 
identity may cause a new problem of inter-group rivalry. The cooperation within each group 
does not necessarily results in the cooperation of the organization as a whole. Both Aoki 
 i6 In a game with two workers
, if one of them can monitor the other's choice, then cooper-
ation can be approximately attained (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986b; Radner, 1986). 
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(1989 .and Lincoln and McBride (1987 mention, 
firms. The comparative analysis of organizations 
tradeoff between these costs and benefits.
the possibility of such rivalry in Japanese 
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1. 
   In the proof, we allow the case in which the noise terms are not independent but the 
optimal wage scheme is still an independent one. Let Pi; (an, ak) be the joint probability of 
Xn = Sri and ?rk = 7rj. In particular, when the noise terms are stochastically independent, 
Pij (an ,ak) = Pi (an) Pj (ak) . Because of no production externality, the marginal probability 
of ?rn = Sri does not depend on ak even in the non-independent case where it is defined as 
Pi (an) = Ej Pi; (an, ak). 
   Suppose that (v~) and (vJ) are the optimal wage scheme for (a, a). We find a new wage 
schedule, which is interdependent, such that under the new schedule collusive workers choose 
(a, a), achieve their eservation utility levels, and that the firm prefers the new ones to the 
original independent ones. Define the new wage schedule (v j) by v = s vi + s v4 .Then since 
v 
 %J 3 = i for i, j E I , 12-0 $2 + ; vJ ='J,-vi' +; v, holds. Thus, the sum of the workers' expected 
utilities under the new wage scheme is equal to 
           (>Pi(ai)vs' -G(al)) +(~ Pj (a2)v; - G(a2)), (A1) 
                    iEI jEI 
which is the sum of their expected utilities under the original one. Since a maximizes each 
worker's expected utility under the original scheme, (Al) implies that cooperative workers 
also choose (a, a) under the new schedule. Also a simple calculation shows that 
             Pij (a' a)v _ _ > Pi (a)vin + s >P,(a)v k U+ G(a) 
             iEI jEI iEI jEI 
since (VII, v2) satisfies (PC). As the last step, the expected wage payments of the firm are 
calculated as follows: 
                                          ~))    ~ ~ Pij ( a) (,0(v ) + 0(v;i ))= Pij (a, a) (cb(s v~ + s v;) + 0(z v, + s vS 
     iEI jEI iEI jEI 
                      >Pi1(a,a)(4(v1')+~b(t4)) 
                                   iEI jEI 
                     >F(a)5(v1') i + 1: Pj (a)4(vj2). 
                                   iEI jEI 
The last expression is the expected wage payments under the original wage scheme. The 
inequality isstrict when (a, a) are not least costly effort. Thus, the firm can implement (a, a) 
with lower costs by the interdependent wage schedule when workers collude than not.
P
Proof of Proposition 3.2. 
   Let e = (a, b) be an E.A.E. effort pair the firm wants to implement. If b = 0, the wage-
scheme defined in the proof of Proposition 2.1 can implement e with lower costs. Thus, suppose 
b > 0. Define the new wage scheme for collusive workers by 
                    vij = s vij + (U + G (a + b)). 
Since (vij) satisfies (3.2), (vij) satisfies (3.3) so that collusive workers elect e. The expected 
utility of worker n is calculated as 
     EEPij(e,e)vij = s EEPij(e,e)vij +;(U+G(a+b)) ? U+G(a+b) 
       iEX jEI iEX jEI 
so that (vij) satisfies (PC). Finally, the firm's expected payments are calculated as follows: 
         Pij (e, e) \`I'(vij) + O (A             )) 
    iEI jEX 
           Pij(e,e){0(12-vij + s(U+G(a+b)))+o(avji+;(U+G(a+b)))} 
           iEI jEI 
       ~~Pij(e,e){a0(vij)+ 22-off +G(a+b))+ a0(vji)+ sq(U+G(~+b))} 
           iEI jEX 
      < Pij (e, e)(/(vij) + ` b(vji)) 
          iEI jEI 
The last inequality holds because of the property that each worker receives exactly his reserva-
tion utility level (Grossman and Hart, 1983, Proposition 2) and of Jensen's inequality. Thus, 
the firm's expected payments are lower under (vij ), which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. 
Proof of (i): ' Suppose instead 01h (8k) > Qj (sk) . Then by Assumption 4.5, Gh (Qh (8k ), 8k) .-
Gh (ut (8k), 8k) > G, (Orh (8k), sk) - Gg (Uj (8k), sk) holds. The left-hand side is at most as small as 
zero by the definition of Qh (•). On the other hand, the right-hand side is strictly positive since 
G, (.) 8k) must be strictly increasing for s > Oj (8k) by the definition of 0j (•). A contradiction. 
Proof of (i4 Let 8k > sk and suppose Qh (sk) < Qh (8k) . Then by Assumption 4.6, we have 
Gh (Orh (3k ), sk) - Gh (Oh (8A;), sk) ~ Gh (0h (sk ), 8A;) - Gh (0h (8k ), sk) . The left-hand side is at 
most as small as zero by the definition of o h (.). On the other hand, the right-hand side is 
strictly positive since Gh (.) sk) must be strictly increasing for s > ah (8k). A contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4.2 
   This proposition is a special case of more general results by de Groote (1988) and Lipp-
man et al. (1987). The proof here follows de Groote (1988). 
   We compare two equilibria (sn, 8k) = (Shh, Shh) and (sn, Sk) _ (Shl, Slh) here. The 
other comparisons proceed similarly. When worker k decreases his effort from h to 1, given 
worker n's social transfer shh, worker k chooses sk = of (Shh) > Oh (shh) = Shh by Lemma 
4.1 (i). Then, given s.1, worker nchooses s1 = Qh (sk) > 7h (Shh) = Shh by Lemma 4.1 (ii). 
Worker k then chooses sk = 0,1 (sk) > Qi (shh) = sk . By continuing this process, we obtain 
nondecreasing equences shh < 8n < sn ... and shh < 3k C sk _.•. Since s is compact, these 
sequences converge to (sn)8k) in S, which is (41)81h) by the continuity ofQh (•) and o,,(-). 
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